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ABSTRACT 
 
A COUPLE’S AFFORDABILITY OF CHILD-BEARING: 
THE ECONOMIC REASON FOR LOW FERTILITY IN KOREA 
by 
Jeongsoo KIM 
 
Despite strong economic growth over the past several decades, Korea has a 
noticeably lower fertility rate than other developed countries. This study examines the 
economic effect on a couple when having a baby through the analysis of the lifetime 
income and cost created by raising a child. The present value of a couple’s expected 
lifetime income is 1,352,205,555 KRW at the ages of 30, while the life time cost a 
couple is 1,061,967,873 KRW. Therefore a couple may expect to take 290,237,682 
KRW of economic affordability for child-bearing. Given income and cost of a 
household, a couple’s optimizing fertility decision will be 1.25 of children, which is 
almost same to the current fertility rate of Korea 1.19 in 2013. The resulting economic 
constraint helps to explain why many Korean couples find it hard to justify having 
children, contributing to the low fertility rate throughout the country.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
Korea is one of the most productive emerging markets in terms of economic 
development. Korean success is explained by several economy theories: Big push model 
(Rosenstein 1943), Trickle-down effect (Aghion & Bolton 1997) and Demographic 
dividend (Bloom 2001). Despite such progress in the past several decades, it is ironic 
Korea is one of the most unproductive countries in the world in terms of fertility. “The 
lowest low fertility1” is threatening the unprecedented growth of Korea. Young couples 
delay their marriage and child bearing, so the level of total fertility rate2 was 1.19 in 
2013, which was close to the lowest both historically and globally3. Also demographic 
structure will be unsuitable for maintaining 50 million of current population size only 
after 20 years.4  
Why do young Korean couples hesitate to get married and reluctant to have 
babies in 2000s? Perhaps most important is the fact that household income is not enough 
to cover the expensive living cost and educational expense associated with having 
                                       
1 Kohler 2002. the level of fertility is under 1.3 by Total Fertility Rate 
2 TFR: The average quantity of children a female bears in her lifetime, presuming current age-
specific birth rates maintains constant around her child-bearing period 
3 See Appendix 1. 
4 UN 2013 “World Population Prospects: the 2012 Revision.” Total Population (both sexes 
combined) by area. Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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children.5 Also the young recognize the necessity for human capital investment to have 
primary job6, which put pressure on the young job seekers to delay their marriages. 
Second young parents prefer one-child family because quality of their child is more 
important. This is also related to rising opportunity cost for child-raising.7  
This research starts from Becker (1960) and Galor (2000)’s arguments, the 
adverse relationship between income and fertility8. With rising GNI per capita in Korea 
as USD $27,000, young couples highly tend to avoid the burden of child-bearing. Here 
this study raises questions: (1) how much money can a couple expects to earn over their 
lifetimes? (2) How burdensome is having a baby when considering living cost and 
educational cost? (3) How many children can a couple afford, considering their 
retirement life?  
According to life cycle hypothesis9 people make the current economic decision 
based on future surplus or deficit, so do young parents. Couples who don’t have 
                                       
5 See Appendix 2,3,4. 
6 Page 4. Sleebos, Joelle E. (2003). “Low fertility Rates in OECD Countries: Facts and Policy 
Responses.”  
7 Page 4. Becker (1960). “An economic analysis of fertility. Demographic and Economic 
Change in Developed Countries.” 
8 Page 4. Galor (2002). “Natural selection and the origin of economic growth.” 
9 Page 6. Modigliani and Albert (1963). "The life cycle hypothesis of saving: Aggregate 
implications and tests."  
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sufficient stable income feel anxiety to bear child. This study conducts financial analysis 
to examine the present value of all cash inflows and outflows seen by Korean couples 
with children during their lifetimes. Through this analysis one may then help to see why 
Korean couples often decide not to have children.  
This paper also contains quantitative survey analysis. In this section young 
Koreans show somewhat different opinions from the reality. People regard child-raising 
much more expensive than real burden. Their low fertility is inevitable choice under the 
insufficient lifetime income and day care service. People perceive the necessity for 
fertility increase, requiring more fertility friendly policies. Current taxation benefit and 
small amount of day care subsidy never succeed to raise fertility rate. More importantly 
people needs sustainable income stability to cover the expensive child-raising cost.  
 
Ⅱ. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Income and low fertility 
Low fertility trend has two important backgrounds: the decrease of possible 
fertility period and the development of contraception methods. The former is related to 
delayed marriage and elongated human capital investment, while the latter is outcome of 
medical development. Recently many researches find the reasons for this low fertility 
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trend in socioeconomic perspectives: late marriage, individual societal achievement, 
necessity for higher education, development of social welfare, and transformed family 
relationship. (Sleebos 2003)  
Low fertility becomes a structural demographic trend because contraception has 
become conveniently available. With the help of easy contraception techniques, fertility 
becomes economic choice for individual, and economists started to analyze low fertility 
by using individual utility function. Becker (1960) addressed that rate of return on 
human capital rises as stock of human capital increases. Also Becker (1960) argued in 
his another book that rise in income resulted decline in fertility and which related with 
rise in the opportunity cost of raising children. 
According to Becker (1990) the higher women’s payroll gets, the more expensive 
opportunity cost of child-rearing gets. Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002) 
also reinforced Becker’s hypothesis that rise of demand for human capital induces 
parents to take more value on quality than quantity of children. Galor and Weil (2002) 
also addressed “the more women are paid as their social participation increases, the more 
expensive their child-rearing is. The number of children a household reproduces and the 
amount of human capital invested in each child are conflicted in the end.” Jones (2008) 
argued “By the historical evidences fertility and income obviously has negative 
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relationship in most countries. The fertility rate tends to decrease as industry 
acceleration proceeds and country goes into higher development stages.” 
On the other hand Clark (2005) argued that Industrial revolution was very 
important turning point in starting low fertility trend, and the negative relationship 
between income and fertility started to appear from the industrialized society. With the 
economic development most countries have experienced growing income and declining 
fertility at the same time. (Jones and Tertilt, 2008) 
 
Figure 1. The negative relation of US fertility and Occupational Income in 2000 dollars 
terms. 
 
Source: Jones and Tertilt (2008), US census data 
 
Unlike decrease of mortality or increase of life span, fertility per se has 
fluctuated by socioeconomic reasons under the current decreasing trend. Even though 
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low fertility is global trend, there are exceptional countries to overcome previous low 
fertility trap with increase in TFR. For example Nordic European countries suffered 
extremely low fertility problem in 1980s, but their fertility rate began rising because of 
social benefits for childbearing. (Pettersson and Lidbom 2009) And there is another 
argument for reasons on current fertility rise in Nordic countries. Lesthaeghe and Van de 
Kaa (1986) proposed the concept of “second demographic transition”, which explains 
fertility rise from change in family norms and attitude; increase in cohabitation and 
extra-marital births.   
Another technical explanation may help to explain a coming rise in the fertility 
rate. A low fertility rate may come from postponing child bearing at the moment, and 
fertility rate rises after finishing “tempo effect.” (Bongaarts and Feeney1998) Tempo 
means the timing of births within a cohort. It is only numeric change of cohort birth rate 
that can be recovered in a future period TFR. According to Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) 
rebound of fertility is just previous postponing childbearing, so adjusted TFR is 
complementary measure for explanation of fertility rate change.  
 
2.2 Life cycle income and cost estimation 
Modigliani and Albert (1963) argue that individual considers not only present 
wealth but also lifetime income when they make decision, which is Lifecycle Hypothesis 
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(LCH). Besides LCH proposes that people less consume and more save in present time 
for preparation for retirement when income is less than the living cost.  
US congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and 
which contains “forward-looking statement” for safe harbor compliance. Department of 
Labor (DOL) in US prepares for lifetime income calculator by Reform act of 1995. For 
estimation of lifetime income this calculator assumed annually 3% income increase, 7% 
of investment return and 3% of inflation increase.  
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA 2013), a think tank under 
the Prime Minister’s Office, announced the whole child-raising cost until 22 years old is 
about 308,964,000 KRW or monthly expenditure of 1,189,000 KRW per child. This 
amount is summation of whole expenditure vertically as of 2012. This does not consider 
retaking fee of SAT, language study in abroad or preparation for marriage, and time 
value of money is not applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
Ⅲ. Affordability of a Couple’s Child-Bearing 
3.1 Methodology 
3.1.1 Overview 
According to life cycle hypothesis10 individual considers its life cycle income 
when they decide whether they bear a child or not. Becker (1960) argues that child is 
also durable goods over the individual budget line11. This study proposes that a couple 
takes into account affordability of its child-bearing when they settle family plan. More 
importantly a couple should consider how much money could be allocated to child-
raising.  
A couple’s affordability of child-raising could be estimated by the present value 
of couple’s expected income minus the present value of couple’s expected living cost. 
The expected lifetime income consists of expected male income, female income and 
pensions. While the expected couple’s lifetime cost contains a couple’s living cost until 
they die.  
                                       
10 Page 6. Modigliani and Albert (1963) "The life cycle hypothesis of saving: Aggregate 
implications and tests."  
11 Page 4 Becker (1960) “An economic analysis of fertility. Demographic and Economic 
Change in Developed Countries.” 
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3.1.2 Discount Rate Assumption 
In order to estimate the economic loss of child-bearing, a couple needs to know 
net cash-flow as a present value. The time value of money is very important variable to 
estimate lifetime income and cost. Here this study would take 20 year-maturity Korean 
Treasury Bond as risk-free interest rate. Because 30 years maturity KTB is issued Sep 
2012, the track record is too short to use as a long term risk free rate. To induce real 
interest rate, the risk free rate is subtracted by Inflation rate. This study uses annual 
change of Consumer Price Index of Bank of Korea for long term inflation rate.  
 Discount Rate = Rate of 20yrs maturity  Treasury Bond – Inflation rate  (1) 
 
Where, 20 years maturity Treasury bond started to be issued since Jan 2006, it 
has shown 4.75% of average rate for 8 years. And Average consumer price during the 
same period was 2.84% annually. Therefore, this study adapts 1.91% of real interest as a 
discount rate for time value. 
 
Table 1. Annual Change of Consumer Price Index (%) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Aver. 
CPI 2.20 2.50 4.70 2.80 3.00 4.00 2.20 1.30 2.84 
Source: KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service) 
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Figure 2. Korean Treasury Bond for 20 years maturity (%) 
 
Source: Bond web 
 
3.2 Expected lifetime income for a household 
3.2.1 Methodology 
This study assumes the total income of household consists of male income and 
female income, and uses the statistic data by MOEL (Ministry of Employment and 
Labor): age distribution and wage profile as of 2013. Each gender shows different age 
and wage profile in its labor market. There must be limitation of this study because not 
all couples are both labor workers and there is age gap within a couple. To avoid the 
noise, this study calculates each gender’s expected lifetime income first, and they are 
summed by the present value at the age of 30 years old.  
 
 
2
3
4
5
6
7
2006.01.25 2007.09.05 2009.04.17 2010.11.17 2012.06.25 2014.02.04
Korea Treasury 20yr
4.75% 
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Yath  =  Yat m  +  Yat f      (2) 
 
Where, Yat is present value of expected income of a household at the certain 
ages. Here, t stands for time value considered in both male and female 
 Yat m  =  Wat m ×  Pa m     (3) 
   Yat  f   =  Wat  f  ×  Pa  f     (4) 
 
Where,  Wat m is average wage of male workers and  Pa m represents probability 
to work which adapt to use employment rate at the ages. 
 In average Korean couples get to marry at the age of 32.2 years old for male 
and 29.6 years old for female as of 2013.12 This study assumes that a couple decides 
their family plan at the age of 30 years old. Even though average marriage age of male is 
a bit higher, 30 years old is still reasonable because mail need to prepare the marriage at 
the age of 30years old.  
 
3.2.2 Expected lifetime income for a household 
Estimation of the expected life time income is calculated from current age 
profile as of 2013. Perhaps women’s age and wage profile could be different in near 
                                       
12 KOSIS(Korea Statistical Information Service) http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList 
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future because of improvement of women’s participation. This study can’t consider 
increasing participation rate of women in the future, which is limitation of this study. 
 
Figure 3. Male wage and employment rate as of 2013 
 
Source. Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) 
 
The employment rate of male workers sustains over 70% until ages of 60, while 
the wage peak is around 45 years old. In the meantime the probability to work is also 
decreasing. According to life cycle hypothesis13, individual makes economic decision 
considering the time when its income decreases.  
                                       
13 Page 6 Modigliani and Albert (1963) "The life cycle hypothesis of saving: Aggregate 
implications and tests." 
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Table 2. Present Value of Male's Expected Income 
    
(Unit, KRW) 
Ages Monthly wage 5yr PV of CF Employment rate 
Present value of 
Labor income 
30 ~ 34 2,566,609 146,760,524 88.4% 
840,992,873 
35 ~ 39 3,061,203 159,242,014 92.1% 
40 ~ 44 3,422,396 161,961,497 92.1% 
45 ~ 49 3,587,452 154,448,472 91.9% 
50 ~ 54 3,533,892 138,409,781 89.5% 
55 ~ 59 3,208,319 114,316,006 83.4% 
60~65 2,368,233 76,766,178 70.7% 
Ages 
National pension 
Monthly Receipt 
Present value Survival rate 
Present Value of 
National Pension 
65 - 69 789,024 23,267,607 97.6% 
83,779,154 
70 - 74 789,024 21,167,409 95.9% 
75 - 79 789,024 19,256,781 92.8% 
80 - 84 789,024 17,518,612 75.5% 
85 - 89 789,024 15,937,334 47.3% 
Over 90 789,024 14,498,787 14.7% 
Present Value of Male's Expected Income 924,772,027 
Note: the discount rate for time value is 1.91%, and pension calculated from recipient who 20 
years of working by the probability 
Source: Estimated from MOEL, KOSIS and NPS data (2013) 
 
The present value of male worker’s expected income in lifetime is estimated to 
924,772,027 KRW which consists of wage income and pension income. The probability 
of wage and pension adapt employment rate and survival rate of the ages14. The reason 
to use survival rate for probability of cash inflow is that pension is paid until the death. 
                                       
14 KOSIS(Korea Statistical Information Service) http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList 
- 14 - 
 
Figure 4. Female wage and employment rate as of 2013 
 
Source. Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) 
 
The employment rate of female workers shows relatively low comparing to 
male’s. The highest employment rate is 66.7% at the ages of late 40s. More importantly 
wage peak is much earlier than male. According to Becker (1960) the higher women’s 
participation has both income effect and substitution effect on fertility15. Especially for 
fertility period ages from 30 to 40 women have the highest payrolls in wage profile. This 
means the highest opportunity cost female workers pay during the period. That could be 
another explanation for low fertility in Korea. 
                                       
15 Becker (1960) “An economic analysis of fertility. Demographic and Economic Change in 
Developed Countries.” 
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Table 3. Present Value of Female's Expected Income 
    
(Unit, KRW) 
Ages Monthly wage 5yr PV of CF Employment rate 
Present value of 
Labor income 
30 ~ 34 2,302,297 131,646,976 56.7% 
365,832,323 
35 ~ 39 2,389,927 124,322,624 54.4% 
40 ~ 44 2,155,836 102,022,801 62.6% 
45 ~ 49 1,990,456 85,693,937 66.7% 
50 ~ 54 1,871,855 73,313,797 63.1% 
55 ~ 59 1,775,078 63,248,021 55.2% 
60~65 1,480,724 47,997,609 44.5% 
Ages 
National pension 
Monthly Receipt 
Present value Survival rate 
Present Value of 
National Pension 
65 - 69 520,388 15,345,769 99.1% 
61,601,205 
70 - 74 520,388 13,960,618 98.3% 
75 - 79 520,388 12,700,495 96.5% 
80 - 84 520,388 11,554,113 88.3% 
85 - 89 520,388 10,511,208 69.3% 
Over 90 520,388 9,562,437 30.6% 
Present Value of Female's Expected Income 427,433,528 
Source: Estimated from MOEL, KOSIS and NPS data (2013) 
 
The present value of female worker’s expected income in her lifetime would be 
427,433,528 KRW which consists of wage income and pension income. The probability 
of wage and pension is matched with employment rate and survival rate of the ages too. 
The reason to use survival rate for probability of cash inflow is that pension is paid only 
until her death.  
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Figure 5. Survival rate of male and female after ages 65 
 
Source: KOSIS 
The survival rate of female is always higher than male’s that is also negative 
effect on the affordability of child-bearing. Fist, because the living cost exceeds the 
pension income of female during retirement and second, female’s pension is smaller 
than male’s. Consequently this rule also applies to male, and the resource allocation to 
child-raising becomes smaller as long as life span increases. 
 
Table 4. Present Value of Couple's Expected Income 
Unit, KRW   
Present Value of Male's 
Expected Income 
Present Value of Female's 
Expected Income 
Present Value of Couple's 
Expected Income 
924,772,027 427,433,528 1,352,205,555 
 Source:  Estimated from MOEL, KOSIS and NPS data (2013) 
Finally the present value of a couple’s expected lifetime income is derived to 
1,352,205,555 KRW by the sum of male’s and female’s life time income. 
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3.3 Expected lifetime cost for a household 
3.3.1 Methodology 
For calculating living cost of a couple, this study applies the household living 
cost of laborers, which is 3,547,558 KRW for 3.35 families as of 2013. (KOSIS)  In 
advance two concepts are necessary to be explained in order to calculate child-raising 
cost. First one is adult equivalent scale for children. Additionally, education costs are 
very significant for child-raising in Korea. This study is going to breakdown each items 
from empirical living cost, and will induce the unit child-raising cost. 
 
Figure 6. Breakdown of Household living cost  
 
3.3.2 Adult equivalent scale for a child 
According to Atkinson et al. (1995) the living cost of household doesn’t grow 
proportionately by additional numbers due to economies of scale. Because of fixed 
living cost and economy of scale, living cost can be saved by increase of family numbers.  
Couple's living cost
Household living cost
Child living cost
Child-raising cost Official cost
Child educational cost
Private cost
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Table 5. Adult equivalent scale (Head Count) 
Adult Equivalent consumption OECD Scale Modified OECD scale 
1 adult 1 1 
2 adult 1.7 1.5 
2 adult, 1 child 2.2 1.8 
2 adult, 2 child 2.7 2.1 
2adult, 3child 3.2 2.4 
Source: OECD Project on Income Distribution and Poverty  
OECD scale includes less economy of scale while modified OECD scale has 
more economy of scale regarding living cost. Thus, living cost of parents is bigger under 
the modified OECD scale. Because current couples tend spend on their living more than 
before, this analysis adapts “modified OECD equivalence scale.”  
 
Figure 7. Adult equivalent scale for Korea
 
Source. Calculated from KOSIS 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
zero one two three four five
1.905 
3.35 
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For example the announced the average household for employed workers is 3.35, 
but the living cost is not proportionately grows by the household numbers especially for 
children. By the adult equivalent scale 3.35 house hold is derived to 1.905 adults for a 
household in Korea.  
 
3.3.3 Present value of child-raising cost 
Child-raising costs include both living cost of the child and education cost. To 
begin with the empirical total living cost needs to be subtracted by education cost. 
According to Atkinson, an adult couple’s living cost is one and half times of one adult. 
According to modified OECD equivalence scale, living cost of a child is 0.3 of one 
adult, and this cost needs to be paid until child’s economic independence, the duration 
is assumed 25 years.  
Perhaps an even more important burden for child-raising is education cost in 
Korea. According to Galor (2002) quality of children is much more preferable than 
quantity. Especially Korean parents still pay for enormous money to prepare university 
entrance exam such as SAT and university education tuition. This study assumes that 
there is no private education cost before elementary school, because private education 
for high-paying kindergartens is not common and there is government subsidy for kids 
before elementary school. 
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The total education cost includes not only official education cost by KOSIS 
(2013) but also private education cost by Kwon (2012). Analysis for private tutoring fee 
in Korea by Kwon (2012) is based on “The Survey of Private Education Expenditures” 
(KNSO, 2008). Lastly, this estimation does not include the additional cost such as 
retaking SAT or graduate school tuition. In sum the present value of a child’s expected 
education cost would be 232,247,834 KRW in 2013 terms. 
 
Table 6. Present Value of Child's expected Cost 
     
(Unit, KRW) 
Ages Monthly living cost of a child* 
Duration 
(Years) 
Present value of 
Labor income 
0 - 25 508,311 25 121,174,557 
Education 
Public 
Education** 
Private 
Education** 
Monthly 
Payment** 
Duration 
(Years) 
Present Value of 
National Pension 
Elementary 319,813 202,522 522,335 6 
111,073,277 
Middle 319,813 265,034 584,847 3 
High 319,813 264,316 584,129 3 
University 1,115,748 336,574 1,452,322 4 
Present Value of Child's expected Cost 232,247,834 
Note: *Official education cost of public and private institution by KOSIS is 319,813 KRW per 
month, **Moderate case for private tutoring by Kwon (2012) and inflation adjusted 
 Source: Calculated from KOSIS, Kwon (2012) 
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3.3.4 Present value of living cost of a couple 
A couple needs consider not only child-raising cost but also the living cost of 
themselves for entire life. The estimation is same procedure with living cost of child-
raising. Now the scale is one and half of one adult’s living cost following modified 
OECD equivalent model. This includes the living after retirement. The unit living cost 
of an adult is 1,694,370 KRW and the living cost of a couple is one and half times of 
the unit cost of one adult. The average life span in Korea is 81.4 years old and female 
lives much longer than male. In order to estimate probability of couple’s lifetime, this 
study applies the average survival rate of male and female.  
  
Figure 8. Survival rate of both genders 
 
Source: MOSPA(Ministry of Security and Public Administration), KOSIS 
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The present value of a couple’s expected living cost in their lifetime would be 
1,061,967,873 KRW, which is derived by one and half of adult’s living cost and 
average survival rate of both genders. Especially the present value of a couple’s living 
cost increases by the longevity of life, and the increasing living cost is much more 
threatening couple’s affordability of child-raising  
 
Table 7. Present value of a couple’s living cost 
    
Unit, KRW 
Ages 
Monthly living 
cost 
PV of couple's  
5 yr living cost 
Average of couple's 
survival rate 
PV of a couple's  
life time living cost 
30 - 34 2,541,554 145,327,880 99.9% 
1,061,967,873 
35 - 39 2,541,554 132,210,190 99.8% 
40 - 44 2,541,554 120,276,539 99.8% 
45 - 49 2,541,554 109,420,051 99.7% 
50 - 54 2,541,554 99,543,500 99.5% 
55 - 59 2,541,554 90,558,433 99.3% 
60 - 64 2,541,554 82,384,382 98.9% 
65 - 69 2,541,554 74,948,144 98.3% 
70 - 74 2,541,554 68,183,121 97.1% 
75 - 79 2,541,554 62,028,727 94.7% 
80 - 84 2,541,554 56,429,845 81.9% 
85 - 89 2,541,554 51,336,334 58.3% 
Over 90 2,541,554 46,702,577 22.7% 
Source: MOSPA, KOSIS 
 
3.4 Couple’s affordability of Child-bearing 
According to life cycle hypothesis young couples should take into account not 
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only current cash flow but also during the retirement16. Even though they afford to a 
child raising cost, the anxiety about their living during the retirement still remains. 
Especially the burden for second child is much more conflicting to their retirement life 
or the quality education. Not many parents may expect their children’s support for their 
life during the retirement because their children also will face heavy burden of raising 
grand children. According to the above estimation, the present value of couple’s 
expected lifetime balance is huge deficit especially when they would have two children. 
Currently a couple who is going to have children economically could bear 1.25 children 
by the affordability analysis. 
 
Table 8. Affordability of child-raising by present value 
 
KRW 
Items Present Value 
A Couple's Expected Life Income      (A) 1,352,205,555 
A Couple's Expected Living Cost      (B) 1,061,967,873  
 Affordability of Child-raising        (A-B)   290,237,682 
Raising Cost of One Child           (C)   232,247,834 
Expected Child-Bearing of a Couple   (A-B)/(C) 1.25 of Children 
Source. KOSIS, and estimated  
                                       
16 Page 6. Modigliani and Albert (1963) "The life cycle hypothesis of saving: Aggregate 
implications and tests." 
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Through financial analysis, this study tries to examine the economic 
affordability of child-bearing and child-raising burden among young employed 
workers. This burden threatens the quality of life during retirement and young couples 
inevitably hesitate to have a baby.  
 
Figure 9. Economic fertility decision by income and cost constraint 
 
Source: Induced from above estimation 
 
If longevity may extend more or other living cost increases, the affordability of 
child-bearing might decrease to 0.79. However If lifetime income increases by 
extending working duration or child-raising subsidy17, the affordability of child-bearing 
might increase to 1.65. No one could force individuals to bear more children in the 
                                       
17 Page 5. Pettersson and Lidbom (2009). “Does child spacing affect children’s outcomes? 
Evidence from a Swedish reform.” 
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reason of societal problem. To overcome this burden a couple extends career period 
especially for women by the help of providing public day care center or institutional 
subsidy to alleviate educational cost of children.  
 
Ⅳ. Survey Analysis 
4.1 Survey Samples and Limitation 
This study conducted questionnaire surveys over 75 people. Their age 
distribution is from 24 to 50 years old. 69% of the samples are married, 76% of the 
samples are male. All samples are living in Seoul or Gyung-gi province.18 This survey 
has limitation because the samples are male-biased and regional-biased. Although the 
causality has limitation to explain the reason of low fertility, this survey analysis could 
give implication for the policy direction in order to boost fertility.  
The sample’s wage, age and working experience are all negative to have children. 
The most significant negative correlation is working experience. This outcome is in line 
with Becker’s negative relationship between income and children19. The strength of the 
                                       
18 See Appendix 5. 
19 Page 5. Jones and Tertilt, 2008 “Fertility Theories: Can They Explain the Negative Fertility-
Income Relationship?” 
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adverseness stays only -0.1 ~ -0.18. This is because children numbers narrows down to 
one or two nowadays. 
 
Table 9. Correlations among variables 
 Children Wage Age Experience 
Children Pearson Correlation 1 -.101 -.160 -.179 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .391 .169 .124 
N 75 75 75 75 
Wage Pearson Correlation -.101 1 .356** .160 
Sig. (2-tailed) .391  .002 .170 
N 75 75 75 75 
Age Pearson Correlation -.160 .356** 1 .584** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .169 .002  .000 
N 75 75 75 75 
Experience Pearson Correlation -.179 .160 .584** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .124 .170 .000  
N 75 75 75 75 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
4.2 Child-raising Burden for Young Couples 
According to above estimated the present value of child-raising cost is 
232,247,834 KRW per child, but in real world young couples imagine more than this 
amount of burden for the child-raising. The proportion that someone who regards child-
raising cost over 300,000,000 KRW or more is about 51%, which is the amount, 
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overtakes estimation of KIHASA (2013), 308,964,000 KRW. This reflects how people 
feel burden on child-raising, and this negatively affect on fertility rate.   
Table 10. Child-raising cost expectation from survey 
 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
4.3 Counterevidence on Economy Theory 
Young couples do not want to put off their current economic status or to sacrifice 
lifetime income, often choosing to give up having more babies.20 This is because they 
don’t have enough lifetime income comparing to their living cost and child-raising cost. 
But if they could have more cash inflow including subsidy or could prolong the 
retirement time, they seem to want more babies.   
The average wage of Korean male of 30-34years old is 2,566,609 KRW and female 
is 2,302,297 KRW. If wage level rises, they would like to have more babies among 
                                       
20 Page 4. Becker. (1994). Becker, Gary S., Murphy, Kevin M. and Tamura, Robert. (1990). 
“Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth.” 
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survey participants. This means the reason for avoiding child-bearing is a bit different 
from the Becker’s argument of opportunity cost.21 There will be other source of income 
such as day care subsidy or holding estates, which has positive correlation with child-
bearing.   
Table 11. Monthly wage and Childbearing from survey 
If Monthly payment Mean of willing to Child-bearing 
If your monthly wage is 2,000,000 won or less 1.77 
If your monthly wage is 3,000,000 won 2.04 
If your monthly wage is 4,000,000 won 2.45 
If your monthly wage is 5,000,000 won 2.66 
If your monthly wage is 6,000,000 won 2.86 
If your monthly wage is 7,000,000 won 2.97 
If your monthly wage is 10,000,000 won or more 3.07 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
Table 12. Day-care subsidy and Childbearing 
Day-care Subsidy Mean of willing to Child-bearing 
If subsidy is 100,000 won per child 1.93 
If subsidy is 200,000 won per child 2.04 
If subsidy is 300,000 won per child 2.16 
If subsidy is 400,000 won per child 2.43 
If subsidy is 500,000 won per child 2.56 
If subsidy is 1,000,000 won per child 2.82 
If subsidy covers all expenditure 3.17 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
 
                                       
21 Page 4. Becker (1960) An economic analysis of fertility. Demographic and Economic Change 
in Developed Countries. 
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Table 13. Retirement extension and Childbearing 
Retirement age Mean of willing to Child-bearing 
If your retirement age is 30 years old 1.49 
If your retirement age is 35 years old 1.68 
If your retirement age is 40 years old 1.88 
If your retirement age is 45 years old 2.15 
If your retirement age is 50 years old 2.51 
If your retirement age is 55 years old 2.76 
If your retirement age is 60 years old or more 3.01 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
 
Table 14. Estate size and Childbearing 
Estate size 
Mean of willing to 
Child-bearing 
If your asset (including house) is 100,000,000 won or less 1.95 
If your asset (including house) is 300,000,000 won 2.34 
If your asset (including house) is 500,000,000 won 2.68 
If your asset (including house) is 700,000,000 won 2.81 
If your asset (including house) is 1,000,000,000 won 3.01 
If your asset (including house) is 2,000,000,000 won 3.16 
If your asset (including house) is 5,000,000,000 won or more 3.24 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
4.4 Implication for policy 
Through the questionnaire survey, this paper intended to prove whether income 
and fertility is really negatively correlated. Becker’s argument could be applied in early 
stage of development, but Korea already passed through the early stage and faces to 
extremely low fertility in the world. Many young couples want to have more babies as 
long as they are guaranteed to have more income and to lessen child-raising cost. 
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Table 15.Priority for fertility inducement policies  
Answers from 75 young couples Average Value Standard Deviation 
Tax benefit 55.69 23.57 
Industry stability 65.99 23.06 
Guarantee late retirement 68.43 24.81 
Higher wage 74.51 22.87 
Subsidy 57.00 27.53 
Public day-care center 75.96 22.96 
Recognition future threat of low fertility 48.73 27.52 
Source: Survey result Sep. 2014 
 
 In order to boost fertility, the Korean government focused on giving tax benefit 
and subsidy as minimum coverage of child-raising cost. However more important 
inducement for young couples is to serve public day-care service, to raise wage and to 
guarantee longer retirement. Many young Koreans also recognize that low fertility can 
save their current pocket, the bigger social burden will return for future generation: 
higher dependency ratio, depletion of National Pension. Obviously more income and job 
stability would be the short cut for boosting fertility rate here in Korea.  
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Ⅴ. Conclusion 
Unfortunately the lowest low TFR in Korea seems very rational economic 
decision by couple’s constraint lifetime budget. Young couples feel anxiety regarding 
their lifetime income and often decide to delay marriage and to avoid child-bearing in 
the end. As a result of this societal problem, the fertility rate of Korea dropped to record 
low of 1.19 in 2013. Income and fertility tend to have an inverse correlation whereby 
South Korea presents an extreme case of this theory. 
The purpose of this study includes illustrating how many children can a couple 
afford with present couple’s lifetime asset or liability may result from having a child in 
Korea. The present value of a couple’s expected lifetime income is 1,352,205,555 KRW 
at the ages of 30, while the life time cost a couple is 1,061,967,873 KRW. Therefore a 
couple may expect to take 290,237,682 KRW of economic affordability for child-
bearing. Given income and cost of a household, a couple’s optimizing fertility decision 
will be 1.25 of children, which is almost same to the current fertility rate in Korea.   
The replacement rate of 2.1 TFR is a too far objective to attain. To reproduce 
more than two children given economic constraint, a couple needs to reduce living cost 
with sacrificing their quality of life. Or parents can reduce education cost for their 
children. However, many economists argue that investing in human capital is highly 
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correlated to higher economic achievement. (Becker 1960, Galor 2002) According to 
Galor (2000) parents choose quality of children rather than quantity. Therefore the 
decreasing TFR in Korea is difficult to restore like Nordic European countries. 
The possible decrease of population size and the expectable increase of 
dependence burden seem to drag down the unprecedented growth of Korea. This study 
argues that current low fertility will return huge burden on our society and already the 
anxiety appears: depletion pensions and falling asset price. To prevent these societal 
disasters Korea needs higher fertility rate, and Korean society can’t just criticize young 
couple’s avoidance of child-bearing considering economic burden of child-raising. 
Rather parents who have children must be compensated by societal support such as 
providing public day care service or more child-raising subsidy. More importantly to 
prolong working period and to complement unstable job security would be long-term 
assignment for sustainable fertility of Korea    
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APPENDIX 
1. Figure 10. Total Fertility Rate Trend in Korea 
 
Source. U.N. World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision 
 
2. Figure 11. Temporary jobs percentage out of initial hiring 
 
Source. Ministry of employment and labor (MOEL) 
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3. Figure 12. Temporary jobs’ wage  
 
Source. Ministry of employment and labor (MOEL) 
 
4. Figure 13. Social insurance comparison 
 
Source. Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) 
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5. Questionnaires for Low Fertility Survey 
A. How much money do you expect to spend in raising children total? That includes 
not only educational cost, but also additional space for housing and living cost until 
their starting to work. 
B. How many children are you willing to have if your monthly wage is 2,000,000 won 
or less ~over 10,000,000? 
C. How many children are you willing to have if your asset (including house) is 
100,000,000 won or less ~ over 5,000,000,000won? 
D. How many children are you willing to have if your retire age is less than 30 years 
old or less ~ over 60 years old? 
E. How many children are you willing to have if government monthly pays 100,000 
won ~ full coverage per child until 20? 
F. What is necessary for increasing fertility rate? (Scale) 
Tax benefit, stable industry, late retirement, higher wage, subsidy, day care center 
G. How much do you have extra income except wage from where you are employed? 
That might include financial asset, real estate or your own extra business. 
H. What is necessary to prolong your retirement for five years more, or extend working 
period 5 years more? 
